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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IN OBLIGATIONS TO DO ACCORDING TO 
EARLY MODERN SPANISH DOCTRINE 
1. Introduction  
Spanish legal doctrine of the sixteenth century is usually considered to have been of 
great importance for the schools of Natural Law that emerged in Northern Europe 
in the course of the seventeenth century. Grotius (Hugo de Groot, 1583-1645), for 
example, is said to have been influenced by a number of sixteenth-century Spanish 
scholars,1 probably through the teachings of Lessius (Lenaert Leys, 1554-1623). In 
this contribution we will focus on the question of whether influence from the early 
modern Spanish doctrine can be shown as regards the issue of specific performance 
and more specifically on the question of whether obligations to do can be enforced 
or whether, by contrast, the debtor can discharge himself by offering damages. 
 As regards obligations to do, there had been a longstanding debate in legal 
scholarship as to what should be considered the general rule. As described in the 
previous contribution, the majority of glossators, followed by Accursius (1182-1263), 
had taught that obligations to do could be enforced specifically.2 The Gloss also 
mentions a deviating view, viz. that the creditor is only entitled to specific per-
formance if the act that the debtor is obligated to perform can only be accomplished 
by the debtor himself. Thus the principal rule was that no one can be compelled to 
act specifically. It was only later, in the era of the commentators, that the majority of 
learned jurists accepted as a general rule for contractual obligations that no one 
could be compelled to act specifically.3 A consistent theory was developed by 
Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1314-1357), whereby, as a principal rule, the obligation of 
the seller to transfer possession to the buyer could be enforced specifically, but 
 
1  See, for example, Feenstra 1973. 
2  See for the interpretation of the Accursian Gloss: Fischer 1934, p. 132-133 (especially as regards 
the obligation of the seller to deliver); Dilcher 1961, p. 285-286; Repgen 1994, p. 89-114, and the 
contribution on medieval scholarship in this volume.  
3  The famous maxim nemo potest praecise cogi ad factum was phrased at the beginning of the 
seventeenth century by Antoine Favre (1557-1624) in his Rationalia in pandectas ad D. 8.5.6.2. 
Some scholars read the origin of this maxim in the gloss Obligationibus ad D. 42.1.13.1. 
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obligations to perform a factum nudum could not. At the same time it was acknow-
ledged that there were important exceptions to this rule. 
 The discussion continued in Spanish legal scholarship of the sixteenth century. 
However, we do not encounter it as a central issue in the doctrine of Early Modern 
Scholasticism. The term ‘Early Modern Scholasticism’ is used here to indicate those 
scholars who in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries unfolded their legal 
theories by interpreting and elaborating De iustitia et jure, i.e. the part of Summa 
Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) dealing with the virtue of justice.4 From 
the beginning of the sixteenth century the use of the Summa Theologiae as a textbook, 
especially in theological education, had increasingly become common practice in 
Salamanca and other academic centres in Spain and Portugal. However, dealing 
with the question of specific performance was not a very obvious element of com-
menting on Aquinas. In Aquinas’ teachings, the central notion is restitutio, which 
covers only a limited number of contractual obligations. Aquinas distinguished be-
tween restoring ‘because of a thing’ (ratione rei), i.e. because a person has something 
among his belongings to which another person is entitled, and restoring ‘because of 
having received something’ (ratione acceptionis), i.e. because a person received 
something in the past that has not yet been restored. Only when an obligation can 
be seen as a form of ‘giving back’, such as in the case of a loan and deposit, may it 
be considered as a kind of restitutio.5 The contractual performance owed by the 
debtor is generally termed solutio, not restitutio, and, as just seen, only in exceptional 
cases will the solutio coincide with a specific kind of restitutio. Not every solutio is a 
restitution. We perform (solutio) what we owe because of a promise or oath or out of 
charity or compassion. When we restore (restitutio), we give back, either in itself or 
in an equivalent, the object we received previously or the object that we have 
among our belongings and to which another person is entitled. Thus, giving back 
something deposited is restitutio rather than solutio.6 
 Unlike the medieval canonists and theologians, early modern scholastics some-
times acknowledged a rather extensive meaning of the notion of restitution, which, 
besides restitution ratione rei and ratione acceptionis, also included a third category, 
viz. restitution out of contract (restitutio ex contractu). In other words, an obligation 
resulting from stipulation or an obligation to pay the selling price. However, such 
obligations do not result from a kind of receipt and, although sometimes termed as 
restitution, they do not belong to the two categories dealt with by Aquinas.7 
Though early modern scholastics discuss the question of whether restitution should 
take place in specie or in damages,8 this discussion does not include the question of 
specific performance in contractual obligations, except those resulting from loan 
 
4  De justitia et jure was not an independent treatise, but an integral part of the Secunda secundae, 
the second part of the second part of the Summa Theologiae. It covered questions 57 to 80. 
5  In the Summa Theologiae this is not a restitution ratione rei, but a restitution ratione acceptionis. 
Moreover, in these cases (loan and deposit) the receipt took place in conformity with the 
owner’s wishes. Aquinas speaks in this respect of absque iniuria, cum voluntate scilicet eius cuius 
est res. See ST II-II q. 62 art. 6 co. 
6  See, for example, Lessius 1696, Lib. 2, cap. 7, dubitatio 4 (p. 62). 
7  Lessius 1696, Lib. 2, cap. 7, dubitatio 5 (p. 63). 
8  See Nufer 1969, p. 51-52.  
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and deposit. Restitution applies primarily to cases of delict and cases where some-
thing has to be given back to its owner. Of all the early modern scholastic writers, 
i.e. in the sense of having commented on the Summa Theologiae, it is only Molina 
who explicitly deals with specific performance in the case of obligations to do, as 
will be shown below. 
 Apart from the writers we class nowadays as belonging to Early Modern 
Scholasticism, there were also academic jurists in Spain who argued much more 
along the lines of the medieval commentators. They sometimes called themselves 
bartolisti and may be considered as Spanish counterparts of the mos italicus. Many of 
them treat the Roman sources as living law, as if these texts were of indispensable 
relevance for both legal doctrine and legal practice, although national, i.e. royal, 
legislation and not the Corpus iuris was indisputably in force in Spain. Only a 
handful of these jurists, however, seem to have continued the medieval debate on 
specific performance. 
 In European legal doctrine of the following centuries, both Natural Law and the 
usus modernus pandectarum, we find references to only three Spanish writers from 
the sixteenth century who discussed the question of whether the obligation to do 
(obligatio faciendi) could be precisely enforced, viz. Covarruvias, Gómez and Molina. 
In his De iure belli ac pacis Grotius did not even consider the question. There is only 
one, isolated remark in his Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche rechtsgeleerdheid, and this does 
not include any references to authoritative writers: according to Natural Law the 
debtor has to perform as promised whenever he can do so, whereas in civil law he 
can discharge himself by compensating damages or paying the contractual fine.9 
 Covarruvias (Diego de Covarruvias y Leyva, 1512-1577), Professor of Law at 
Salamanca and later Bishop of Segovia, deals with the question of whether a seller 
who is still in the position to deliver can be compelled to do so in his libri variorum 
resolutionum, which were first published in 1552. He examines the question of 
whether a contractual obligation to do is enforceable if confirmed by oath in his 
work In caput Quamvis pactum, De Pactis, Lib. VI Decretalium Relectio, which is a 
commentary on a provision (VI 1.18.2) of the Liber Sextus and was first published in 
1553. Antonio Gómez (1501-1562/1572), who also taught in Salamanca, discusses 
the enforceability of the obligation to do in his Commentariorum variarumque resoluti-
onum iuris civilis communis et regii tomi tres. This work deals with the law of succes-
sion, the law of contract and the law of delict and was first published in 1572. The 
Jesuit Luis de Molina (1535-1600), who for many years taught in Évora (Portugal), 
examines the same subject in the second treatise, published in 1597, of his De justitia 
et jure. The title of this work suggests it is a commentary on Aquinas’ doctrine of 
restitution. Indeed the book is strongly related to specific issues discussed in the 
Summa Theologiae, such as eternal law (lex aeterna) and its obligatory character and 
 
9  Grotius, Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche rechts-geleerdheid III.3.41 (ed. Dovring, Fischer & Meijers 
1965, p. 214): Doch hoe wel nae ’t aengebooren recht iemand die iet toegezeit heeft te doen, 
gehouden is zulcks te doen, ingevalle het hem doenlick is, zoo mag hy nochtans nae ’t burger-
recht volstaen, mids voldoende den bedingher ofte aenneemer de waerde van ’t gunt hem daer 
aen was gelegen, ofte de straffe zoo daer eenige is bedonghen by gebreck van de daed te 
voldoen.  
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the relationship between the moral concepts of good and evil. The second treatise, 
however, contains an extensive treatment of the law of obligations. There is also the 
legal practitioner Juan Gutiérrez (1535-1618), whose monograph on legal acts 
confirmed by oath, the Tractatus de iuramento confirmatorio, et allis in iure variis 
resolutionibus, was referred to several times by Molina. Lastly, Antonio Pérez (1583-
1672), Professor of Law at Louvain University in the early seventeenth century, may 
also be taken into account in view of his descent – he was born in Alfaro – and his 
particular interest in developments in Spanish law. His commentary on the Codex, 
the Praelectiones in duodecim libros Codicis Justiniani Imperatoris, which appeared in 
1626 – contains some fragments on our subject. 
 These Spanish jurists have in common that they usually say they are discussing 
the obligation to do (obligatio faciendi), although in fact they also discuss other duties 
to act, such as those based on the law of property or the law of succession or on 
provisions from the Corpus iuris. Secondly, it may be noted that it is always two 
options that are considered: the debtor can be forced (by the magistrate?) to perform 
specifically or he can discharge his obligation by paying damages. What the plaintiff 
had claimed is not taken into account. It may, however, be assumed that he sought 
performance in kind. Otherwise the question of whether the debtor can discharge 
his obligation by paying damages would not arise. Moreover, the writings of these 
jurists contain hardly any references to the iusiurandum in litem, i.e. the competence 
of the plaintiff entitled to specific performance to estimate the value of what is owed 
to him and to claim monetary compensation. It appears that the creditor is 
considered to prefer specific performance of an obligation to do, and the question is 
whether or not the debtor can be sentenced to actually perform what he promised to 
do and how this sentence can be executed.   
 
2. What is the principal rule of early modern ius commune ?  
The entire discussion in the sixteenth century concerning specific performance was 
restricted to obligations to do (obligatio faciendi). Again, we have to distinguish 
within this category between the obligation of the seller to transfer possession to the 
buyer (tradere), which is a specific kind of obligatio faciendi, and the obligation to 
perform a factum nudum, which exists in something the debtor had to do himself. 
There was hardly any debate on the obligation to give (dare), i.e. the obligation to 
transfer ownership. The reason for this may be that the jurists only discussed 
controversial issues. As we have seen in the contribution on medieval scholarship, 
the obligation to do was precisely such an issue, while the obligation to transfer 
ownership was not. 
 The object of the obligatio faciendi was qualified as incertum, that is as not being 
precisely laid down, since the quantity and nature of the performance could not be 
determined in detail. If the debtor did not act as promised, only damages, viz. the 
interest of the creditor in the performance that did not take place, but should have, 
were taken into account.10 In obligations to do, a penalty clause was consequently 
 
10  Pérez 1653, ad C. 7.47, nu. 12 (p. 454), referring to D. 42.1.13 and D. 45.1.72. 
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usually inserted to cover the eventuality of non-performance because, in order to 
claim damages, the creditor had to prove the extent of his interest, and this was not 
always easy.11 
 The majority of sixteenth-century Spanish jurists agree that, according to the 
principal rule of ius commune, the debtor in obligations to do can discharge himself 
from his obligation by offering damages instead of performing in specie. Only 
Molina defends a deviating opinion, as will be shown below.12 The two most impor-
tant texts substantiating the view that the debtor has to be sentenced to pay a certain 
amount of money are derived from the Digest. The jurists derived from D. 42.1.13.1 
the statement that if a debtor has not acted as promised, he will be sentenced to pay 
an amount of money, as in all obligations to do.13 Similarly, from D. 45.1.72pr they 
derived the view that, in the case of non-performance of a stipulation to do 
something, money must be given. The latter case deals with stipulations to do 
something, such as to transfer possession (tradere) of a plot of land, to excavate a 
trench, to erect a building or to perform daily labour. Splitting up such obligations 
would make the stipulation void. Thus, in such cases the action can be awarded, 
based on an estimation of the value of the act that should have taken place.14 
 The jurists also refer to Bartolus de Saxoferrato for his opinion that the phrase 
‘Celsus ait posse dici iusta aestimatione facti dandam esse petitionem’ in D. 45.1.72pr can 
lead to only one conclusion, viz. that the promised act cannot be enforced. Bartolus’ 
commentary on D. 45.1.72pr is, however, quite extensive, and the Spanish scholars 
refer only to a small part of it. This fragment deals with the four reasons why the 
obligation to do (obligatio faciendi) in the case of default (mora) is provided with an 
obligation for damages (obligatio ad interesse), whereas the obligation to give 
(obligatio dandi) is not. Bartolus is dealing here with obligations to do resulting from 
a contract, not those resulting from a last will or based on provisions from the 
Corpus iuris. According to Bartolus – but this is by no means always noticed by the 
Spanish jurists! – the obligatio facti will continue to exist, but an alternative obligatio 
ad interesse will come into existence alongside it.15 The four reasons Bartolus 
mentions are as follows: 
 
 
11  Pérez 1653, ibid., referring to Inst. 3.15.7. 
12  See Covarruvias, Relectio regulae ‘Quamvis pactum’ in VI, Pars I, § IV nu. 11, in: Covarruvias 
1679a, p. 350; Gómez 1572, cap. X, nu. 22 (fo. 236r-v); Gutiérrez 1597, Pars I, cap. XXXIX nu. 1 
(fo. 150v); Molina 1614, disp. 542, nu. 10 (p. 767) and disp. 562, nu. 4 (p. 832); Pérez 1653, ad C. 
4.49 nu. 3 (p. 228). 
13  D. 42.1.13.1 (…) si minus, quia non facit quod promisit, in pecuniam numeratam condemnatur, 
sicut evenit in omnibus faciendi obligationibus. 
14  D. 45.1.72.pr. Stipulationes non dividuntur earum rerum, quae divisionem non recipiunt, veluti 
viae itineris actus aquae ductus ceterarumque servitutium. idem puto et si quis faciendum 
aliquid stipulatus sit, ut puta fundum tradi vel fossam fodiri vel insulam fabricari, vel operas 
vel quid his simile: horum enim divisio corrumpit stipulationem. Celsus tamen libro 
trigensimo octavo digestorum refert Tuberonem existimasse, ubi quid fieri stipulemur, si non 
fuerit factum, pecuniam dari oportere ideoque etiam in hoc genere dividi stipulationem: 
secundum quem Celsus ait posse dici iusta aestimatione facti dandam esse petitionem. Gómez 
also referred to D. 45.1.54.1 and D. 45.1.113.1.  
15  Bartolus ad D. 45.1.72, nu. 35 (ed. Polara 1996b, fo. 30rb-va). 
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(i) Since performance in the case of obligations to give requires only a single 
moment of time, while performance in the case of obligations to do requires a 
considerable amount of time, enforcement of the obligation to do in specie would 
imply a kind of slavery (with reference to D. 43.29.1-2). This argument is said to 
have its origins in Dinus de Mugello (1253-1298).16 
 
(ii) An obligation to give cannot be differentiated according to time or person. It 
does not matter when the performance takes place and by whom. Acts, however, 
have to be performed by day or by night, in sickness or in health and so on (with 
reference to D. 12.6.26.12). 
 
(iii) In the case of an obligation to give, it is always in the creditor’s interest that the 
object due is delivered, whereas in obligations to do it is sometimes in the creditor’s 
interest that actual performance takes place, but sometimes not. Thus the obligatio 
facti is provided with an obligatio ad interesse in order to avoid the creditor claiming 
something other than damages (i.e. his interest in the performance). This argument 
is said to derive from Pierre de Belleperche († 1308).17 
 
(iv) An act is always incertum since it does not exist in the nature of things before it 
is carried out. Thus after default (mora), the obligatio facti will be provided with an 
obligatio ad interesse existing in a quantity that, in its certified presence, exists in the 
nature of things. In obligations to give, however, there is something certum from the 
very beginning, viz. the ownership of the object that exists in the nature of things. In 
the case of three of these arguments Bartolus maintains that they do not always ap-
ply to all obligations to do, especially not to the obligation to transfer possession.18 
 
From Bartolus the Spanish scholars also adopt the rule that if the obligation to do 
something does not result from a human (contractual) provision, but instead from a 
provision of the Corpus iuris, the debtor can be compelled to perform. This can be 
found in a different fragment from Bartolus than the one referred to above and 
reflects the opinion of Jacobus de Arena († ca. 1296).19 
 The Spanish jurists agree that the creditor has an action at his disposal to make 
a claim for damages to the extent of his interest. For this opinion Bartolus seems 
once again to be the main authority,20 more specifically his argument, mentioned 
above and ascribed to Pierre de Belleperche, that the obligatio facti will be provided 
 
16  See for this view of Dinus de Mugello: Repgen 1994, p. 162.  
17  Cf. for the view of Pierre de Belleperche: Repgen 1994, p. 148-156. 
18  Bartolus ad D. 45.1.72, nu. 13 (ed. Polara 1996b, fo. 28va). 
19  Bartolus ad D. 39.5.28 nu. 3 (ed. Polara 1996a, fo. 72va). See for this opinion of Jacobus de 
Arena: Repgen 1994, p. 159; the Spanish writers also refer for the opinion that the debtor 
cannot be compelled to perform to other commentators, such as Paulus de Castro (1360/62-
1441), Alexander de Imola (1424-1477) and Iason de Maino (1435-1491).  
20  The reference to Bartolus can be found in Guttierez, op. cit., Pars I, cap. XXXIX nu. 2 (150v), 
who also referred to the French jurist Pierre Rebuffe (1487-1557), who taught canon law at 
Montpellier, Toulouse and Paris, as well as to the French jurist Jean Feu (Johannes Igneus, 
1477-1549) and to the commentary on Inst. 4.6 (De actionibus) of Angelus de Gambilionibus. 
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with an obligatio ad interesse, whereas the obligatio dandi will not. The fundamental 
point in Bartolus’ theory is that a person stipulates what is in his own interest and 
nothing else. If I promise you a horse, your interest is simply the value of the horse. 
And this value will without any doubt be included in the obligation. But if I 
promise to do something for you, your interest may not be the value of the act, 
unless it would coincide with this value. Thus you cannot compel me to act, because 
if you could, you would enforce more than your interest. To avoid this, the obligatio 
facti will be provided with an obligatio ad interesse and I will discharge myself if I 
provide adequate compensation.21 
 Having adduced a number of medieval and contemporary authorities to 
substantiate the opinion that, in contractual obligations to do, the debtor cannot be 
forced to perform specifically, Antonio Gómez presents as his own determinative 
argument – apart from all the provisions mentioned above – the fact that enforce-
ment of the act infringes human liberty and is actually a kind of slavery. He sup-
ports his view by referring to D. 35.1.71.2.22 As discussed above, this argument was 
already mentioned by Bartolus, who maintained that it originated from Dinus de 
Mugello. It is an argument that can indeed be found in Dinus’ writings.23 Until the 
late Middle Ages this argument had played an important role in discussions of the 
enforcement of stipulations to do. 
 As stated above, it is only Luis de Molina who presents a deviating view, which 
was not defended by medieval scholars from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 
According to Molina, it is questionable whether a debtor still capable of performing 
in specie can discharge himself, even against the creditor’s wishes, by paying 
damages. Is he bound in such a way that it is the debtor’s choice either to perform 
the act, for example to build a house for the creditor, as he had obliged himself 
towards the creditor to do, or alternatively to pay compensation in money?24 The 
commentators maintained as their general opinion that he was not obliged to 
perform in specie and could discharge himself by paying damages. This was said to 
be confirmed by D. 45.1.72, as Odofredus († 1265) already maintained, as well as by 
D. 42.1.13 and other texts. At this point, however, Molina presents his own opinion. 
 
21  Bartolus ad C. 7.47, nu. 28 (ed. Polara 1996c, fo. 74vb): (…) Ego dico quod glossa tua dicit 
veritatem cuius occasione debes videre rationem que est ratio quia in obligatione facti succedit 
obligatio ad interesse, in obligatione dandi non. Dico tibi stipulationes sunt invente ut 
unusquisque stipuletur sibi pro eo quod sua interesse modo. In obligatione dandi si promitto 
equum, interest tua habere equum simpliciter quantum ualet. Et ideo illud sine dubio est in 
obligatione. Sed si promisi tibi aliquid facere forte non interest tua quantum illud factum valet, 
nisi constaret. Et ideo non potes me precise compellere ad factum, quia si[c] compelleres me 
ultra quam interesse tua, ideo succedit obligatio ad interesse, dando tibi interesse liberor. Cf. 
Repgen 1994, p. 203, note 51.  
22  Gómez 1572, cap. X, nu. 22 (fo. 236v). 
23  See Repgen 1994, p. 162. According to Repgen, Dinus, in his turn, had adopted it from Irnerius 
(ca.1055-ca.1130). 
24  Molina 1614, disp. 562, nu. 4 (p. 832): (…) Caeterum dubium est, an, stando in iure communi, 
qui se obligauit ad factum, teneatur ad illud praecise, interim dum impleti illud potest; an vero 
satisfaciat, etiam invito creditore, solvendi ei interesse, ita quod in optione debitoris tunc sit, 
vel praestare factum, v.g. fabricare creditori domum, ut se illi obligauit, aut soluere illi 
interesse, prout debitor maluerit (…).  
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The only thing that can be derived from the provisions just referred to is that, if the 
debtor is in default (mora) or negligence (culpa), it is not he but the creditor who has 
a choice.25 If the creditor prefers to claim damages, the act can be ‘split’ according to 
the interest to be estimated, although the obligation to act cannot itself be sub-
divided.26 Molina subsequently maintained that if these imperial provisions were to 
imply that the debtor could change his mind afterwards and decide at his own 
discretion to pay damages instead of performing specifically, they would be entirely 
unreasonable, and would, without any interest for the state or common well-being, 
prescribe something contrary to the nature of the matter itself. A wise, equitable and 
just lawgiver would keep himself far away from such a thing. Moreover, if this were 
actually the meaning of these provisions, they should be abrogated and torn out 
from the Corpus iuris.27  
 
3. The eight exceptional cases discussed by Antonio Gómez  
This contribution limits itself to discussing sixteenth-century Spanish jurists’ views 
on the controversial issues relating to the enforcement of obligations to do. It is 
appropriate, however, to note that having established the main rule of early modern 
ius commune, based on the mos italicus, various writers subsequently discuss the 
exceptions to the rule. The most clear overview can be found in Antonio Gómez, 
who describes eight cases in which the principal rule that the debtor cannot be 
compelled to perform the act he promised is put aside.28 Again, it should be noted 
that these exceptions are not restricted to obligations to do. In fact all kinds of 
situations where an act (factum) can be enforced are described, including duties that 
cannot be classed as obligations to do. It is possible that the term obligatio is taken 
here in a wider sense than nowadays, i.e. including all legal duties that people 
create and not just the specific relationship between creditor and debtor resulting 
from a contract, quasi-contract, delict or quasi-delict. Moreover, these eight cases do 
not constitute an exhaustive list of all the exceptions that can be traced in the 
commentators’ lengthy discussions. A brief look at the commentary of Alexander 
Tartagnus on D. 45.1.72pr is enough to show that there are probably some more. 
Tartagnus mentioned examples not found in Gómez’s list, such as obligations to 
 
25  As previously assumed by Azo, Hugolinus and Accursius. 
26  Molina 1614, disp. 562, nu. 4 (p. 832): Neque enim ex illis iuribus, aliud colligitur, quam quod, 
quando debitor in mora, et culpa fuit, optio sit, non penes ipsum, sed penes creditorem, petere 
interesse, et quod quando ex parte creditoris interesse petitur, diuidi possit factum, quo ad 
interesse, in quo aestimatur, cum tamen obligatio ad factum sit in se indiuidua.  
27  Molina 1614, disp. 562, nu. 4 (p. 832): Ac certe, si iura illa Caesarea, vel quaecunque alia, 
intendissent, quod, quando quis obligatus esset ad factum, in opinione ipsius postea esset, non 
id praestare, sed solum interesse, irrationabilia prorsus essent, & quae sine ullo reipublico 
commodo, ac bono, contrarium eius statuerent, quod habet, ac postulat natura ipsa rei, quod 
longe alienum est a prudente, aequo, ac iusto legislatore, essentque proinde abroganda, a 
corporeque iuris praescindenda. 
28  Gómez 1572, cap. X, nu. 22. The cases are described from the words ‘conclusio generica fallit in 
aliquibus casibus, in quibus debitor praecise cogitur facere: primus est quando‘ (fo. 236va) until the 
passage starting with ‘Advertendum tamen quod licet quis possit promittere‘ (fo. 237rb).  
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perform of a religious or charitable nature (a pia causa).29 The same exception is 
mentioned by Gutiérrez, who refers to D. 45.1.122.2 and to the De privilegiis piae 
causae tractatus of André Tiraqueau (1488-1558).30  
 Some of the exceptions discussed by Gómez can hardly be seen as exceptions. If 
the obligation to do is confirmed by oath, the debtor can be compelled to perform, 
but according to many jurists this is because the secular courts, too, have to apply 
Canon Law in such cases.31 Moreover, the seller’s obligation to provide the buyer 
with possession of the thing he bought is often seen as an exceptional subcategory 
of the obligatio facti. The eight exceptions, which were already acknowledged as such 
in medieval doctrine and are discussed by Gómez on the basis of existing opinions 
of the commentators, are the following: 
 
- Casus primus. The first exception deals with duties that are not always obligations 
in the strict sense of the word, i.e. where the party obliged is someone’s debtor. 
These duties have a specific nature and all exist exclusively in a judicial setting. A 
procurator is obliged to defend the case of his absent principal, and thus can be 
compelled to consent in the litigation (D. 3.3.35.3). A debtor can be compelled in 
court to specify his debt (D. 42.2.6.1), while in criminal proceedings someone can 
similarly be forced through torture to tell the truth. The obligation to perform 
certain acts in litigation in specie was already mentioned by Bartolus.32 In Baldus de 
Ubaldis (1327-1400), judicial acts already developed into a kind of category where 
enforcement of the obligation to do was allowed in view of the public character of 
those acts or the common interest.33 The exception of D. 3.3.35.3 as a specific case 
was already mentioned by Dinus.34 
 
- Casus secundus. The second exceptional category consists of the duties prescribed 
by law, i.e. resulting from provisions of the Corpus iuris. As seen above, Jacobus de 
Arena already considered these obligations enforceable in specie, unlike those 
resulting from a human (contractual) provision. One of the examples given by 
Gómez was already explicitly mentioned by Jacobus de Arena: if a neighbour has 
the right to prohibit building on a plot of land and he orders (nunciatio) the owner to 
stop building, the owner may continue building after giving certain guarantees. But 
if the owner loses his case against the neighbour, the latter can compel him to take 
down what was built and does not have to accept damages (D. 39.1.21.4).35 
 
- Casus tertius. If a duty results from a last will, it can be enforced. If someone is 
ordered by testament to perform a certain (public) work, but wants instead to pay 
an amount of money so that the public authorities themselves can perform this 
 
29  Imola 1528, ad D. 45.1.72, nu. 27 (fo. 53v). See also Repgen 1994, p. 276-277.  
30  Gutiérrez 1597, Pars I, caput 39, nu. 4 (fo. 150vb).  
31  For the binding force of the oath in Canon Law see Dondorp 2009, p. 141-143.  
32  Repgen 1994, p. 197-198.  
33  Repgen 1994, p. 234.  
34  Repgen 1994, p. 163. In the case of D. 3.3.35.3 the enforceable act results from a cautio de 
defendendo (stipulation). Earlier glossators already pointed out that this act could be enforced. 
35  Repgen 1994, p. 83 and 159.  
65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Early Modern Spanish Doctrine 
 
 
work, his claim will be dismissed since it was the testator’s wish for the work to be 
performed personally by the heir (D. 32.11.25). This opinion was already defended 
by Bartolus.36 
 
- Casus quartus. The fourth case deals with promises to do confirmed by oath, which 
are discussed below (§ 5). 
 
- Casus quintus. The fifth case concerns situations where someone is obligated to act 
because of the existence of a real right, for example if an owner vindicates his 
property. In such cases the court has coercive means at its disposal to enforce 
restitution of the disputed object (D. 6.1.68). Gómez refers here to Bartolus, although 
the latter explicitly qualified the defendant in such cases as someone who was not 
obligated in the sense of the legal relationship between the creditor and debtor in an 
obligation.37 A person sentenced under the actio confessoria will also be compelled 
precisely to accept the exercise of a servitude (D. 8.5.7). Again Gómez refers here to 
Bartolus.38 
 
- Casus sextus. It is possible that the promised act does not involve any monetary 
interest or benefit, as, for example, when someone has promised to lecture in a 
certain discipline in return for a salary (honorarium) or to teach children grammar, or 
similar things. For reasons of public interest a person cannot discharge himself in 
such cases by monetary compensation. For the origin of this opinion Gómez refers 
to Bartholomaeus de Salyceto (ca. 1330-1411).39 
 
- Casus septimus. The seventh case concerns the obligation of the seller to deliver the 
objects sold, which is regarded as a specific subcategory of the obligation to do 
(tradere) and is dealt with below (§ 4). 
  
- Casus octavus. If someone can be sued, not only by a real action, but also by a 
personal action to restore things he borrowed or received in deposit, while the other 
party retained ownership, the obligation to do can be enforced specifically, as long 
as the debtor is capable of performing. Again, the main argument is derived from 
 
36  Repgen 1994, p. 197 and 288.  
37  Bartolus ad D. 45.1.72pr, nu. 37 (ed. Polara 1996b, fo. 31ra): (…) aut contra eum qui non est 
obligatus, ut cum agitur reali. (…) Secundo casu, quando agitur contra eum qui non est 
obligatus. Et tunc dic ut supra per Petrum, quia aut agitur ad factum propter interesse ut 
principaliter et liberatur prestando interesse ut l. Paulus § i. supra quibus mo. pig. uel hyp. 
solu. (D. 20.6.13) aut ad factum principaliter et tunc compellitur precise ut l. Qui restituere (D. 
6.1.68) (…). Cf. Repgen 1994, p. 343. 
38  Bartolus ad D. 45.1.72pr, nu. 37 (ed. Polara 1996b, fo. 31ra): (…) Idem dico quando agitur 
confessoria, ut reus cogatur precise pati, et sic bene loquitur glossa, que est super si. ser. uen. l. 
Harum (D. 8.5.7), in glossa super verbo ‘iubeat’ (…). Cf. Repgen 1994, p. 343. 
39  See Salyceto 1541, ad C. 7.47 nu. 25 (fo. 48va): (…) quia aut factum est tale, quod non potest 
explicari per alium, quia non est sibi similis qui id facere sciret. Et tunc precise compelli possit. 
Et est ratio quia tacite sic videtur actum et Pe. dixit et maxime quando interesse non stat in 
pecuniario commodo, quia factum fiendum non concernit commodum bursale, ut si promisit 
quis pueros tuos erudire in grammatica vel arte (…). See also Repgen 1994, p. 257.  
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D. 6.1.68. This view – in other words, that in this kind of obligation to restore, which 
appears to be considered a subcategory of obligations to do, the debtor’s act can be 
enforced – had already been the prevailing view since the days of Bartolus.40 
 
4. Can the seller be compelled to deliver? 
In Roman law the seller was not obliged to transfer ownership of the sold object to 
the buyer (dare), but instead to transfer possession (tradere). In the Corpus iuris, this 
performance is mainly qualified as a kind of doing (facere), but sometimes as a 
category of its own (praestare). In many texts in the Digest the only distinction 
drawn was between dare (transferring ownership) and facere (doing something), as 
in D. 45.1.2.pr. Only sporadically, as in D. 38.1.37pr, do we find a tri-partition 
between dare (to transfer ownership), facere (to perform a mere act) and praestare (to 
transfer possession). As seen in the previous contribution, this performance prae-
stare, usually termed as tradere, was regarded in the Middle Ages as a kind of facere. 
However, even if the early modern maxim nemo praecise potest cogi ad factum was 
applicable to obligations to do, it would be questionable whether it also applied to 
the obligations of the seller. After all, the seller’s performance deviated from many 
other kinds of facere. In many respects it much more closely resembled the transfer 
of ownership (dare), as was the common view of the jurists since Bartolus. Convey-
ing possession was no laborious undertaking, as could be the case in other (mere) 
acts, and it would only take a single moment, comparable to the moment required 
for transfer of ownership. 
 Covarruvias presents as the general opinion the view that the seller’s obligation 
to deliver the goods he sold is a ‘mixed’ obligation and neither an obligation to give 
nor one to do. If the seller owns the goods and is in a position to transfer ownership 
to the buyer through conveyance, he can be compelled to do so. If, however, he does 
not have the goods, he is obliged, in conformity with the opinion of the early 
glossator Martinus, to compensate the buyer’s interest.41 According to Covarruvias, 
this opinion was followed by Bartolus (ad D. 12.1.9 and ad D. 45.1.72 q. 8 nu. 38), 
who also stated that this was the general rule, as well as by others.42 Subsequently 
Covarruvias mentions a different view, viz. that the seller is entitled to discharge 
himself by paying damages, which doctrine, he says, was extensively taught by the 
Italian humanist jurist Andrea Alciato (1492-1550), in his commentary on C. 7.47.43 
 Gómez presents as the unanimous opinion of all jurists that, if the seller is still 
in a position to transfer possession of the object sold, the principal rule that the 
debtor cannot be compelled to perform the act is put aside. He refers for this 
opinion to sources such as the gloss Tradatur ad Inst. 3.23.1 and the commentary of 
Bartolus on D. 19.1.1 (nu. 12) and D. 45.1.72pr (nu. 39), as well as to the Tractatus de 
 
40  See Repgen 1994, p. 199-200.  
41  With references to the Gloss ad D. 19.1.1 and ad Inst. 3.23.1. 
42  With references to Alexander de Imola, Panormitanus, Felinus Sandaeus, Iason de Maino, 
Pierre Rebuffe (1487-1557) and to the work De emptione et venditione of Antonio de Burgos 
(1455-1525). 
43  See Covarruvias, Variarum resolutionum II, cap. 19 nu. 1, in: Covarruvias 1679b, p. 264-265. 
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emptione et venditione eorumque omnium quae ad eadem materiam pertinent of the 
canonist Fabiano Giocchi, who practised in Rome (Fabianus Giocchis de Monte 
Sancti Savini, 1421-1498), and to the Lectura super titulo de actionibus institutionum of 
Angelus Aretinus (de Gambilionibus), who lectured at the Institutes in Ferrara and 
Bologna between 1441 and 1445.44 
 This unanimous opinion concerning the seller’s obligation is also recorded by 
Antonio Pérez, who follows the medieval jurists in their opinion that the obligation 
of the donator, too, can be enforced. Pérez rejects some of the arguments used to 
question the enforceability of the seller’s performance. In the first place he follows 
the opinion of Bartolus. In other words, the view that what the seller has to do is 
some kind of obligation midway between dare and facere (Bartolus ad D. 19.1.1). 
Thus, according to Pérez, the solution is also midway: on the one hand the seller is 
compelled to perform, but, on the other hand, only providing he is capable of doing 
so. If not, he can discharge himself by offering damages (D. 19.1.1 and D. 19.1.11.9). 
One has to realize that the seller’s performance is not a pure act (merum factum), but 
an act that also contains the title of the goods or of their ownership, as in a case, 
such as D. 45.1.52.1, where someone promises to convey free possession (vacua 
possessio). If the seller himself is the owner, delivery will make the buyer the owner. 
If the seller himself is not the owner, delivery will make the seller liable for 
eviction.45 Secondly, Pérez does not see any objection in the imperial rescript of 
C. 4.49.4, which rules that if the seller does not comply with his contractual duty out 
of impudence (procacia), the interest of the buyer that no breach of contract has 
taken place has to be estimated. According to Pérez, such non-performance may 
occur, just as sometimes the seller performs too late out of impudence. In the latter 
case, too, the buyer will have a claim for damages. Lastly, the statements in C. 
4.49.10 and 12 – that the buyer has an action for damages – do not imply that the 
seller may not be compelled to perform in specie. In all the cases referred to, the 
seller is no longer in a position to hand over possession: the wine or the meat 
perished during default (mora) or were sold for a second time and subsequently 
conveyed to the second buyer, or it was the buyer who preferred monetary 
compensation instead of performance in specie.46 
 
5. The obligation to do, confirmed by oath 
Among the Spanish jurists there was a common opinion that if the debtor confirmed 
his contractual obligation to do something by oath, he could be compelled to 
perform what he promised. The main argument to substantiate this view derives 
from the Accursian Gloss, or rather the way in which the Gloss has been interpreted 
since the days of Bartolus. In D. 12.4.5pr someone received a sum of money to travel 
 
44  Gómez 1572, cap. X, nu. 22, casus septimus (fo. 237rb). 
45  Pérez 1653, ad C. 4.49 no. 4 (p. 228), with references to the Coniecturae iuris civilis and the De 
erroribus pragmaticorum et interpretum iuris by Antoine Favre (Antonius Faber, 1557-1624), to the 
Miscellanea iuris civilis by Jean de Coras (Corasius, 1515-1572) and the commentary of Jacques 
Cujaz (Cujacius, 1522-1590) and Hugues Doneau (Donellus, 1527-1591) on D. 45.1.72.  
46  Pérez 1653, ad C. 4.49 nu. 4 (p. 228).  
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to Capua. The journey was subsequently cancelled because of bad weather or the 
debtor’s health. Could the money then be reclaimed? This could not be done if the 
arrangements that had been made were such that it was necessary for the journey to 
be undertaken. The text of the Digest is not clear as to what these arrangements 
were, but the Gloss gave an example to explain how such necessity could have 
come into existence: ‘as in the case he had sworn to go’.47 Thus, according to the 
Gloss, the promise to do something confirmed by oath makes the journey necessary. 
Bartolus concluded from this statement that the person who took the oath could be 
obliged to perform the act specifically. Further support for this opinion is found in 
commentators as Baldus de Ubaldis (1327-1400), Alexander de Imola (1424-1477) 
and Iason de Maino (1435-1491).48 This opinion is described as the prevailing view 
among late medieval and contemporary jurists. In this respect Gutiérrez refers to a 
consilium of the French jurist Nicolas Bohier (1469-1539), who even maintained that, 
if an oath is taken to perform an act, paying damages implies committing perjury.49 
 Despite the existence of a prevailing doctrine, there were certainly also jurists 
who did not agree. Covarruvias, for example, mentions a consilium of Pier Filippo 
Corneo (Corneus, 1420-1492), the commentary on X 5.4.4 of Giovanni d’Anagni 
(Anania, † 1457) and a case recorded in the Decisiones Neapolitanae of Matteo 
d’Afflitto (1448-1528).50 Moreover, two counterarguments are explicitly refuted. 
Gómez discussed the text of C. 4.30.16, which was said to imply that the oath 
always had to be interpreted in conformity with the nature of the contract it 
confirmed, while this act or contract could be ineffective because of a lack of consent 
between parties. Thus, in such cases, neither the act nor the oath confirming it 
would have any effect. In the case Gómez has in mind, however, there is sufficient 
consent between parties and thus the oath has the effect of providing the contract 
with an obligation to perform in specie.51 Covarruvias discusses a similar argument, 
which is said to have been brought up by Filippo Decio (Decius, 1454-1535) in his 
commentary on the Liber Extra.52 According to this argument, a person who swears 
to do something takes this oath in accordance with the qualities ascribed by law to 
the promise that it confirms, in other words, with the competence to discharge 
himself by paying damages if he does not want to perform the act. According to 
Covarruvias, however, this argument can easily be invalidated. By its very nature a 
promise to do something includes the consent and necessity to perform precisely. 
This results from the very phrasing of the promise. Only secondarily (ex accidenti), 
 
47  The gloss Necesse habeas ad D. 12.4.5pr: ut quia iurasti. 
48  See Covarruvias, Relectio regulae ‘Quamvis pactum’ in VI, Pars I, § IV nu. 11, in: Covarruvias 
1679a, p. 350; Gómez 1572, Casus quartus (fo. 236vb) and Gutiérrez 1597, Pars I, caput 39 nu. 6 
(p. 151-152). 
49  Gutiérrez 1597, Pars I, caput 39, nu. 6 (p. 152); cf. Boerius 1554, consilium 14, nu. 9 (fo. 46v). 
50 Covarruvias, Relectio regulae ‘Quamvis pactum’ in VI, Pars I, § IV nu. 11, in: Covarruvias 
1679a, p. 350.  
51  Gómez 1572, Casus quartus (fo. 236vb-237ra), with a reference to Alexander Tartagnus and 
Iason de Maino. 
52  The actual reasoning in Decio is complicated. The central question is whether the oath adds 
something new to the act it is confirming, for example validity that did not yet exist. See Decius 
1564, ad X 2.1.1 nu. 23 (fo. 144va-145ra).  
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i.e. in a case of default (mora) where the debtor does not want to act, is he liable to 
pay damages. The oath has to be understood, however, as confirming the obligation 
according to its principal nature.53 
 Apart from all these arguments, used in the theory of civil law, some jurists 
consider Canon Law applicable whenever a contract is confirmed by oath. Since, 
under Canon Law, the debtor can be compelled to perform (see below), the same 
holds good for the person confirming the obligation to do something under oath. 
Secular courts, too, should apply Canon Law in such cases because of the spiritual 
character of the oath.54 It is also reasoned that, because of the conflict between 
imperial law and papal law, it is papal law that should prevail. The conclusion 
should therefore be that, if an obligation to do is confirmed by oath, the debtor can 
be compelled to perform what he promised under oath, providing he is capable of 
so doing.55 
 
6. What is the rule of early modern Canon law ? 
According to Covarruvias, as followed by Gutiérrez, Canon Law has as a principal 
rule that, unlike in the ius commune, debtors of obligations to do can be compelled to 
perform specifically what they promised.56 This view is derived from X 1.35.1, the 
famous decretal Antigonus, and also X 1.35.3, which prescribes that courts must 
strive for actual observance of promises. This principal rule of Canon Law, whereby 
the debtor can be compelled to perform what he promised independent of an oath, 
can also be found in various medieval jurists, such as Ludovicus Romanus 
(Pontanus, 1409-1439)57 and Nicolaus de Tudeschis (Panormitanus, 1386-1445). In 
his commentary on the Corpus iuris, Ludovicus maintained that, according to Canon 
Law, the debtor may be compelled to perform in specie if he is still capable of so 
doing.58 For this opinion he adduced two arguments. In X 1.35.3 the Pope stated in 
 
53  Covarruvias, Relectio regulae ‘Quamvis pactum’ in VI, Pars I, § IV nu. 11, in: Covarruvias 
1679a, p. 350. 
54  Molina 1614, disp. 562, nu. 4 (p. 832).  
55  Covarruvias, Relectio regulae ‘Quamvis pactum’ in VI, Pars I, § IV nu. 11, in: Covarruvias 
1679a, p. 350, referring to consilium 12 of Aymo Cravetta a Saviliano (1504-1569).  
56  Covarruvias, Relectio regulae ‘Quamvis pactum’ in VI, Pars I, § IV nu. 11, in: Covarruvias 
1679a, p. 350 and Gútierrez 1597, Pars I, caput 39, nu. 4 (fo. 150vb).  
57  Pontanus 1547, ad D. 45.1.72pr, nu. 76 (fo. 82va): Decima conclusio probabilis esse potest, quod 
equitate canonica indistincte obligatus ad factum, si impleri potest, debet compelli ad 
faciendum, et propter hoc duo. Primo per doctrinam tex. in c. Qualiter de pact., ita formaliter 
dicentis: studiose agendum est ut ea, que promittuntur opere impleantur. No. ergo quod papa 
loquens de promissione in genere desyderat implementum formale et specificum ut in uer. 
opere. Secundo quia inter simplicem loquelam et iuramentum quo ad effectum implendi Deus 
non facit differentiam xxii q. v. c. Iuramenti. Sed si promissio facti fuerit iurata, cogitur iurans 
precise ad faciendum (…).  
58  This fragment was quoted by Iason. See Maino 1590, ad D. 45.1.72pr, nu. 33 (fo. 92va): (…) Alio 
modo limitat Lud. Rom. ut ista regula non procedat de aequitate canonica, ut obligatus ad 
factum, indistincte potest compelli praecise ut faciat si potest adimplere per c. Qualiter de pac. 
et quia inter simplicem loquelam et iuramentum Deus non constituit differentiam 22 q. 5 c. 
Iuramenti, sed ubi in obligatione facti adest iuramentum, cogitur praecise ad faciendum (…). 
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general terms (and not just for oaths!) that a promise must be fulfilled, while in C.22 
q.5 c.12 God is said not to draw any distinction between a simple statement and a 
promise under oath as regards its observance. Thus in the case of a simple promise, 
the creditor may indeed demand performance in specie. If, however, the promise is 
confirmed by oath, the performance always has to be enforced. If not, the debtor 
will commit perjury. According to Tudeschis, an important and influential canonist 
from the fifteenth century, the rule as formulated by Bartolus for the ius commune 
was not the valid principle for Canon Law or Divine Law. The stipulation was 
introduced by civil law so that a person could stipulate what was in his own interest 
and could acquire such interest. What Bartolus said is based on this nature of the 
stipulation. According, however, to Divine Law and Canon Law, a person is bound 
to fulfil his promise even if it has not been confirmed by oath because acting against 
a promise involves a sin.59 
 There were also, however, some deviating opinions among the canonists, with 
the most important being that defended by Johannes Andreae (ca. 1270-1348) and 
Felinus Sandaeus (1444-1503). In their opinion a debtor could not be forced to act as 
he promised according to Canon Law, since X 1.43.4 (X 1.43.9 is probably meant) 
implies that a debtor is capable of discharging himself by paying damages. 
Covarruvias and Gutiérrez, however, saw an alternative obligation in this decretal. 
If the debtor had promised to do something under penalty of a contractual fine, he 
could in that case pay the fine instead of performing the promised act, but not in 
other cases.60 To support his view, Gutiérrez also refers to some authoritative texts 
from beyond the sources of Canon Law: D. 2.15.16 and the Gloss and the scholars on 
this text and Part. 5.11.34. The latter text will be dealt with below. 
 Lastly, Gutiérrez refers to the deviating view of Hieronymus Zanettinus 
(1457-1493). This jurist from Bologna was again more inclined to the opinion of 
Johannes Andreae. The view that a simple promise to do something (without oath) 
would also bind the debtor to perform in specie would contradict X 1.43.4. Following 
the prevailing view of the canonists implied that Canon Law deviated from civil 
law in two respects, viz. firstly that one could have a remedy based on a pactum 
nudum, and secondly that one could be compelled to act as promised, contrary to 
the civil law provision of C. 5.11.1. Zanettinus thus rejected the opinion of 
Ludovicus Romanus and concluded that a person could not be compelled under 
Canon Law or civil law to perform the promised act in specie, whether it was 
promised by nude pact or by stipulation.61 
 
  
59  Panormitanus 1547, ad X 2.24.16 nu. 9 (fo. 171va). 
60  Covarruvias, Relectio regulae ‘Quamvis pactum’ in VI, Pars I, § IV nu. 11, in: Covarruvias 
1679a, p. 350: (…) Iure canonico promissorem facti omnino liberari, si velit praestare id quod 
interest: nec cogendum esse praecise facere, per text. in dict. cap. dilecti de arbitris: cui 
respondetur ibidem, ideo non cogi quem praecise ad factum, sed liberari praestatione poenae: 
quia alternatiue consetur obligatus ad factum, vel ad poenam, qui facere sub poena promisit; 
see also Gútierrez 1597, Pars I, caput 39, nu. 4 (fo. 150vb). 
61  Hieronymus Zanetinus, De differentiis inter ius canonicum et civile, in: Tractatus 1584, fo. 
197vb-208va, differentia 66 (nu. 120-121, fo. 203va): (…) et quod etiam posset precise ad factum 
compelli contra dispositionem iuris civilis, contra. l. j. C. de dot. promis., ex quo remanet 
conclusio contra Lud. quod promittens factum praecise non potest compelli ad illud, siue 
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7. What can be said about Castilian law ?  
Three Spanish writers, Gómez, Gutiérrez and Molina, discuss whether the ius 
commune was amended by Castilian law, i.e. whether the rule that the debtor could 
not be compelled to do as he promised was set aside by specific royal legislation. 
The principal source of law they investigate is the Siete Partidas (1265), which as a 
source of law came only in third place after the Ordenamiento de Alacalá (1348) and 
the various fueros. In many fields of the law, however, the Partidas were of great 
importance since they dealt with all kinds of questions that were not as such treated 
in more prevalent sources of law. 
 Only Gómez attempted to overcome the differences between ius commune and 
Castilian law and to interpret the Partidas in conformity with the Corpus iuris. The 
other two jurists mentioned above maintained that the Roman rule on enforcing 
obligations to do was definitely derogated by royal legislation. Under Castilian law, 
too, the obligation to do would therefore be enforceable in specie. They derived this 
view from a number of texts from the Partidas. In two of these cases, Part. 5.11.13 
and Part. 5.11.35, this seems to follow quite easily, while two other texts, Part. 5.14.3 
and Part. 3.27.5, are more complicated and have been subject to scholarly debate. 
Part. 5.11.13 prescribes that as long as a debtor is still capable of doing what he 
promised, he can be forced by the local court to act.62 Part. 5.11.35 deals with a 
debtor who is obligated to do something or alternatively to pay a contractual fine. 
The most important words in this text are (…) tenudo es de pechar la pena, o de dar, o de 
fazer lo que prometio qual mas quisiere (…). These words are interpreted to mean that 
the choice is up to the stipulator. Thus, the debtor can be forced to act if the 
stipulator desires him to do so. In this respect the text deviates from the ius 
commune, a fact that was also noticed by the Gloss of Gregorio Lopez de Tovar 
(1496-1560) on this text.63 
 More controversial is Part. 5.14.3, which prescribes (starting from the words 
Otrosi dezimos) that a person who is no longer capable of doing something in the 
way he promised should meet the creditor’s demand in another way according to 
the discretion of the local court. Moreover, such person should also pay additional 
damages since his performance was not identical to what he promised.64 Gutiérrez 
 
promittat pacto nudo, siue stipulatione, tam de iure canonico, quam de iure ciuili. 
62  Part. 5.11.13: (…) deue le apremiar el iuez del logar que lo cumpla alli (…); see Gutiérrez 1597, 
Pars I, caput 39, nu. 5 (fo. 151ra).  
63  See the gloss Qual mas quisiere ad Part. 5.11.35: (…) tu ergo tene menti istam legem partitarum, 
contra communem opinionem; see also Gutiérrez 1597, Pars I, caput 39, nu. 5 (fo. 151ra).  
64  Part. 5.14.3 Como deuen fazer la paga o el quitamiento, e a quien, e de que cosas. Pagamiento de las 
debdas deue ser fecho a aquellos que las han de recebir, e deue se fazer de tales cosas como 
fueron puestas e prometidas en el pleyto quando lo fizieron, e non de otras, si non quisiere 
aquel a quien fazen la paga. Pero si acaesciesse que el debdor non pudiesse pagar aquellas 
cosas que prometiera, bien puede dar le entrega de otras a bien vista del judgador. Otrosi 
dezimos que si el que ouiesse fecho pleyto de fazer alguna cosa, e non lo pudiesse fazer en la 
manera qua auia prometido, que deue cumplir de otra guisa el pleyto, segun su aluedrio del 
judgador del lugar. E deue pechar le el daño e el menoscabo que le vino por razon que non fizo 
aquella cosa, asi como prometio (…).  
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takes this text to mean that if the debtor is indeed capable of performing the act he 
promised, he can be compelled to perform. This follows from an a contrario 
interpretation of the text. Gutiérrez comes to exactly the same conclusion, albeit 
through a different kind of reasoning. The text says that the a person who cannot 
perform the act he promised must fulfil his promise in a different way and, apart 
from that, should pay damages. But if a person who is still capable of performing 
the act he promised were able to discharge himself by just paying damages, this 
would imply that the latter was obligated to a much lesser extent than the person no 
longer capable of performing. This would be contrary to the law, and so the person 
who can perform his promise should be compelled to do so.65 The same would 
result from Part. 5.11.35, which maintains that, whenever a promise is made to do 
something, the debtor can be required to act as promised and will be liable for all 
the damages and interest resulting from the fact that he acted in a different way 
than promised.66 It follows from the last lines of this provision that if the debtor 
does not perform before joinder of issue, he will be liable for the performance or its 
equivalent, as well as for damages and interest.67 Thus, according to Gutiérrez, the 
debtor can be compelled to act as promised and royal provisions must have altered 
the ius commune.68 This was also the opinion of Lopez in his Gloss.69 
 The fourth and last text presented by Gutiérrez as evidence for his opinion that, 
under Castilian law, the debtor can be enforced to perform as obliged is a fragment 
derived from Part. 3.27.5.70 It deals with a defendant who is sentenced because he 
had to do something. According to the Partidas he has to be compelled to perform 
the act exactly as it was determined or he promised. Gutiérrez interprets this as a 
clear confirmation of what is stated in Part. 5.11.13 and so reads into the text that, as 
a general rule, the court will sentence the debtor to act as he promised. Gómez, 
however, defends a different opinion: these lines of the Partidas are in conformity 
 
65  Gutiérrez 1597, Pars I, caput 39, nu. 5 (fo. 151ra): Ergo a contrario sensu (quod argumentum est 
fortissimum in iure, innuit lex illa) quod si potest facere, cogitur praecise facere et non liberatur 
soluendo interesse: quod etiam alia inductione probatur in d. l. 3. nam si liberaretur soluendo 
interesse etiam eo casu, quo posset facere, lex illa non eum obligaret in casu impotentiae ad 
faciendum alio modo arbitrio iudicis ultra damna et interesse, ut expresse lex obligat, quia alias 
in plus teneretur et compelleretur, qui non posset factum adimplere, quam qui posset: quod 
non est dicendum, quia est contra ius: igitur obligatus ad factum tenetur praecise implere et ad 
id cogendus est si potest facere.  
66  Part. 5.11.35: (…) quel puede demandar, lo que le fue prometido, con todos los daños, e los 
menoscabos, que recibio por razon que non cumplio aquello que prometio (…).  
67  Part. 5.11.35 (…) Pero si el que fizo la promision, quisiere luego començar a cumplir lo que auia 
prometido en ante que respondiesse, al otro en juyzio, deue le ser cabido. E si lo cumpliere, 
entonce non seria tenudo de pechar los daños nin los menoscabos que de suso diximos. 
68  Gutiérrez 1597, Pars I, caput 39, nu. 5 (fo. 151rb).  
69 The gloss Pudiesse fazer ad Part. 5.14.3: Innuit quod si posset facere cogitur praecise facere et 
non liberaretur soluendo interesse. Et idem videtur probari in .l. 13. et in .l. 35. supra titul. 
vndecimo. eadem partita. Et sic de iure isto partitarum, non procedet communis opinio Bartoli 
et aliorum (…).  
70  Part. 3.27.5: (…) E si la sentencia fuesse dada contra el demandado, en razon de alguna cosa 
que deuiesse fazer, deue lo apremiar que lo faga assi como fue puesto, o lo prometio (…). NB. 
Guttiérez quotes this fragment as Part. 3.27.4, Gómez as Part. 5.27.3. We follow the Salamanca 
1555 edition with the Gloss.  
73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Early Modern Spanish Doctrine 
 
 
with the ius commune. The fragment is supposed to refer to such (exceptional) cases 
where the debtor, also according to the ius commune, could be compelled to 
perform.71 Gómez does not give any examples here, but these could include a 
debtor who not only promised to do something, but was also sentenced to perform. 
According to the ius commune, such a defendant could sometimes be compelled to 
act manu militari. In other words, to restore something or to hand over possession. 
Gutiérrez rejects this interpretation by Gómez in two ways. Firstly, the words ‘he 
has to be compelled’ (deuelo apremiar) are phrased generally and not just for the 
specific kind of performance Gómez has in mind. Such words cannot be found in D. 
45.1.72pr, which contains the basic rule of ius commune, i.e. that the debtor can 
discharge himself by paying damages. Secondly, the words ‘he has to be compelled 
to do’ (deuelo apremiar que lo faga) have to be read in direct connection with the rest 
of the sentence: ‘just as it was determined or he promised it’ (assi como fue puesto, o lo 
prometio). Thus, this provision from the Partidas prescribes explicitly and formally 
that performance should take place as promised. Consequently, performing an 
equivalent is not allowed, as is allowed in the customary laws of the various nations 
(iura vulgaria). 
 Having rejected the interpretation of Gómez, Gutiérrez deals with another 
objection to his own view, viz. that Part. 3.27.5 is restricted to cases where the 
defendant is sentenced to perform. Some writers come to this conclusion in view of 
the phrase ‘if the defendant was sentenced in view of a thing he had to do’ (E si la 
sentencia fuesse dada contra el demandado, en razon de alguna cosa que deuiesse fazer). In 
the case of a sentence to perform a certain act, the ius commune, too, would 
sometimes compel the defendant to act precise. This follows from D. 6.1.68, 
confirmed by the Gloss and the scholars on that text, as is also mentioned by 
Gómez72 and Rodrigo Xuárez (1440/60-1500/20). However, according to Gutiérrez, 
Part. 3.27.5 not only refers to a person who is sentenced to do something, but also to 
a person who just promised to do something. This view results from the words ‘or 
promised it’ (o lo promitio). Gutiérrez’s final conclusion coincides with the opinion of 
the Lopez gloss mentioned above. In other words, under the royal legislation of 
Castile, the debtor can be compelled to act as promised and in this respect the ius 
commune is derogated from by the Partidas. Gutiérrez refers to two other jurists for 
support. The first is Juan de Matienzo (1520-1579), who maintains in his 
commentary on the nueva recopilaciòn that, according to royal legislation, a debtor 
can always be compelled to act and that the restricted interpretation by Gómez of 
Part. 3.27.5 is not necessary.73 The second jurist that Gutiérrez refers to is Juan 
Gracián Falconi (saec. XVI).74 
 
  
71  Gómez 1572, cap. X, nu. 22 (fo. 236va): Nec corrigitur ista communis opinio per notabilem 
legem partite. 5. tit. 27.3. par. ubi dicitur, quod si senten. est lata contra debitorem facti 
compellatur per iudicem facere, quia illa lex debet intelligi, ut debitor compellatur eo modo, 
quo de iure communi tenetur, et compelli poterat, scilicet, ut faciat, alias soluat interesse.  
72  Gómez 1572, cap. X, nu. 22, Casus quintus (fo. 237ra).  
73  See Matienzo 1597, Lib. 5, tit. 16, l. 2 glos. 6, nu. 2 (fo. 422vb-423ra). In this way the old doctrine 
of Martinus de Fano († after 1272) is said to be confirmed again. See Repgen 1994, p. 134 for 
this opinion of Martinus de Fano. Sixteenth-century jurists knew this opinion only through 
secondary sources such as the commentaries on the Corpus iuris of Bartolus and Bartholomeus 
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Gutiérrez concludes his explanation of specific performance of obligations to do in 
the law of Castile with some remarks on legal practice. Domestic servants 
(ministrales) in particular were sometimes forced to perform specific acts as part of 
their duties. The court could sentence them to imprisonment if they did not fulfil 
their promises or otherwise satisfy the other party. In two respects, however, legal 
practice has somewhat modified the application of this rule. Firstly, if the plaintiff’s 
interest in specific performance did not exceed the payment of damages, the court 
could allow the defendant to offer monetary compensation if the defendant 
confirmed that performance in specie was difficult for him. Secondly, the rule did 
not apply if performance was impossible, as noted above.75 
 
8. Conclusions 
The question of specific performance was debated to a limited extent by sixteenth-
century Spanish jurists in the tradition of the mos italicus. The only early modern 
scholar who pronounced on the subject seems to have been Luis de Molina. What 
the writings of these jurists reveal concerning specific performance is far more a 
useful survey of late medieval thinking, seen from their sixteenth-century 
perspective, and a summary of the status quo in legal doctrine than a development 
of new legal arguments and dogmatics. The jurists examined restrict themselves to 
recording the opinions of the commentators and canonists from the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries, together with some references to contemporary writers. Usually 
this is achieved, probably for didactical reasons, in a simplified manner. When 
discussing the obligation to do in general, they refer to passages where Bartolus 
deals with obligations to do resulting from contract. We do find traces of a scholarly 
debate, but not as many detailed and deviating views as must have actually existed. 
Thus, the Spanish jurists of the sixteenth century who dealt with this topic reflected 
much more on the past and the actual situation rather than attempting to develop 
new theories or to innovate existing law. 
 Almost all the jurists examined discuss the principal rule of ius commune that, in 
view of D. 42.1.13.1 and D. 45.1.72pr, the debtor cannot be compelled to act as he 
promised, and they accept this opinion as the majority stance of the commentators. 
At the same time, however, this legal principle of the ius commune seems to be 
pushed aside by the opposite rule that the debtor can be compelled to perform the 
promised act whenever this is still possible. Within the ius commune itself the 
principal rule is sometimes put aside in favour of the opposite rule, not only in 
some minor exceptional cases, but also in respect of the seller’s obligation to deliver 
and if the obligation to do is confirmed by oath. Outside the ius commune, i.e. in 
Canon Law and under the specific legislation of Castile (the Partidas), the opposite 
rule prevailed. 
 The clause ‘whenever performance is still possible’, as we find in Canon Law 
and Castilian law, is not insignificant. Within the civilian tradition it is applied only 
 
de Salyceto. 
74  Reference to his Quingentarum regularum utriusque iuris (…) liber unus, regula 184, nu. 3. 
75  Gutiérrez 1597, Pars I, caput 39, nu. 5 (fo. 151rb-151vb).  
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to the obligation of the seller, but not to obligations to do in general. A seller can be 
forced to deliver ‘whenever performance is still possible’. In the case, however, of 
an obligation to perform a factum nudum, the debtor cannot be compelled to act even 
if he is still capable of doing so. Molina introduces this clause in his teachings on the 
enforcement of obligations to do according to the ius commune. In this way, this 
clause starts to constitute the border line between, on the one hand, the rule that 
obligations to do cannot be enforced (the principal rule of the ius commune) and, on 
the other, the rule that obligations to do can be enforced (the exceptional rule of the 
ius commune and the principal rule of Canon Law and Castilian Law). In the case of 
the ius commune it constitutes the exception to the principal rule that performance 
cannot be enforced because, at least according to Molina, performance can be 
enforced whenever it is still possible. Molina also rejects the possibility of appealing 
to D. 45.1.72pr in such a situation, i.e. allowing the debtor to change his mind and to 
decide at his own discretion not to perform specifically, but instead to pay damages. 
In the cases of Canon Law and Castilian law, this clause was a condition for 
applying the rule that performance could indeed be enforced. Through this way of 
reasoning Molina interprets the ius commune in conformity with the prevailing 
views outside the sphere of the civilian tradition, i.e. in conformity with Canon Law 
and Spanish indigenous law. In his Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche rechtsgeleerdheid, 
Grotius adopted the opinion of Molina as being in force only for Natural Law. In his 
description of the law of the Province of Holland, Grotius continued to adhere to 
the pecuniary sentence instead of enforcing obligations to do specifically but, as will 
be discussed in the next contribution, it is questionable whether this view of Grotius 
had not already in his own days been superseded by the explicit provisions on civil 
custody that were adopted in the late sixteenth-century procedural instructions for 
the higher courts of the province.  
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